Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

Kshitij Kulkarni, Theo Diamandis and Tarun Chitra

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Abstract: Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering users' transactions to maximize fees or from inserting new transactions that front-run users' transactions. One of the most common types of MEV involves a `sandwich attack' against a user trading on a constant function market maker (CFMM), which is a popular class of automated market maker. We analyze game theoretic properties of MEV in CFMMs that we call \textit{routing} and \textit{reordering} MEV. In the case of routing, we present examples where the existence of MEV both degrades and, counterintuitively, \emph{improves} the quality of routing. We construct an analogue of the price of anarchy for this setting and demonstrate that if the impact of a sandwich attack is localized in a suitable sense, then the price of anarchy is constant. In the case of reordering, we show conditions when the maximum price impact caused by the reordering of sandwich attacks in a sequence of trades, relative to the average price, impact is $O(\log n)$ in the number of user trades. Combined, our results suggest methods that both MEV searchers and CFMM designers can utilize for estimating costs and profits of MEV.

Date: 2022-07, Revised 2023-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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