Optimal Allocation of Limited Funds in Quadratic Funding

Ricardo A. Pasquini

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We examine the allocation of a limited pool of matching funds to public good projects using Quadratic Funding. In particular, we consider a variation of the Capital Constrained Quadratic Funding (CQF) mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (2019) where only funds in the matching pool are distributed among projects. We show that this mechanism achieves a socially optimal allocation of limited funds.

Date: 2022-07, Revised 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-ppm
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