Strongly Stable Matchings under Matroid Constraints

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference of each agent may contain ties. In this setting, we consider the problem of checking the existence of a strongly stable matching, and finding a strongly stable matching if a strongly stable matching exists. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem.

Date: 2022-08, Revised 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.11272 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2208.11272

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().