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Combinatorial Procurement Auction in Social Networks

Yuhang Guo, Dong Hao and Bin Li

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies one emerging procurement auction scenario where the market is constructed over the social networks. In a social network composed of many agents, smartphones or computers, one requester releases her requirement for goods or tasks to suppliers, then suppliers who have entered the market are also encouraged to invite some other suppliers to join and all the suppliers in the network could compete for the business. The key problem for this networked auction is about how to incentivize each node who have entered the sell not only to truthfully use her full ability, but also to forward the task to her neighbours. Auctions conducting over social networks have attracted considerable interests in recent years. However, most of the existing works focus on classic forward auctions. Moreover, there is no existing valid networked auction considering multiple goods/tasks. This work is the first to explore procurement auction for both homogeneous and heterogeneous goods or tasks in social networks. From both theoretical proof and experimental simulation, we proved that the proposed mechanisms are proved to be individual-rational and incentive-compatible, also both the cost of the system and the requester could get decreased.

Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-net
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