Solidarity in natural gas storage: A potential allocation mechanism of stored quantities among several players during times of crisis

D\'avid Csercsik and Anne Neumann

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The recently experienced disruptions in the EU's energy supply pointed out that supply crises pose a real thread and the member states must be better prepared do deal with the related challenges. According to the current practice, member states fill their gas storages independently, while it is not clear how solidarity could be put into practice in the future, i.e. how the accumulated reserves of one or more members may be potentially redistributed to help others in need. In this paper we propose some possible guidelines for a potential solidarity framework, and formalize a game-theoretic model in order to capture the basic features of the problem, considering the related uncertainty of the future conditions related to gas storage levels and possible transmission bottlenecks as well. The proposed mechanism of supply-security related cooperation is based on voluntary participation, and may contribute to the more efficient utilization of storage capacities. Via the computational model we demonstrate the operation of the proposed framework on a simple example and show that under the assumption of risk-averse participants, the concept exhibits potential.

Date: 2022-09, Revised 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.05089 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2209.05089

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().