Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking

Battal Do\u{g}an, Kenzo Imamura and M. Bumin Yenmez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce a method to derive from a characterization of institutional choice rules (or priority rules), a characterization of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) matching rule based on these choice rules. We apply our method to school choice in Chile, where we design choice rules for schools that are uniquely compatible with the School Inclusion Law and derive a set of matching properties, compatible with the law, that characterizes the DA rule based on the designed choice rules. Our method provides a recipe for establishing such results and can help policymakers decide on which allocation rule to use in practice.

Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.06777 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2209.06777

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().