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Implementation with Uncertain Evidence

Soumen Banerjee and Yi-Chun Chen

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Abstract: We study a full implementation problem with hard evidence where the state is common knowledge but agents face uncertainty about the evidence endowments of other agents. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation in mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria called No Perfect Deceptions. The implementing mechanism requires only two agents and a finite message space, imposes transfers only off the equilibrium, and invoke no device with "...questionable features..." such as integer or modulo games. Requiring only implementation in pure-strategy equilibria weakens the necessary and sufficient condition to No Pure-Perfect Deceptions. In general type spaces where the state is not common knowledge, a condition called higher-order measurability is necessary and sufficient for rationalizable implementation with arbitrarily small transfers alongside.

Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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