Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

Matheus V. X. Ferreira and David C. Parkes

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Abstract: Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible for composing a block of transactions and picking an execution ordering -- the order in which transactions execute in the exchange. Due to the lack of a regulatory framework, it is common to observe miners exploiting their privileged position by front-running transactions and obtaining risk-fee profits. In this work, we propose to modify the interaction between miners and users and initiate the study of {\em verifiable sequencing rules}. As in the status quo, miners can determine the content of a block; however, they commit to respecting a sequencing rule that constrains the execution ordering and is verifiable (there is a polynomial time algorithm that can verify if the execution ordering satisfies such constraints). Thus in the event a miner deviates from the sequencing rule, anyone can generate a proof of non-compliance. We ask if there are sequencing rules that limit price manipulation from miners in a two-token liquidity pool exchange. Our first result is an impossibility theorem: for any sequencing rule, there is an instance of user transactions where the miner can obtain non-zero risk-free profits. In light of this impossibility result, our main result is a verifiable sequencing rule that provides execution price guarantees for users. In particular, for any user transaction A, it ensures that either (1) the execution price of A is at least as good as if A was the only transaction in the block, or (2) the execution price of A is worse than this ``standalone'' price and the miner does not gain (or lose) when including A in the block.

Date: 2022-09, Revised 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mst and nep-pay
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Published in STOC 2023: Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023, 723-736

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