Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade

Maxim Senkov

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that a project milestone has not been reached by an interim deadline. I demonstrate that the outlined structure of optimal information disclosure holds irrespective of the agent's profit share, benefit from the flow of funding, and the common discount rate.

Date: 2022-10, Revised 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
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Working Paper: Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade (2022)
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