Exploring the stability of solar geoengineering agreements

Niklas V. Lehmann

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A simple model is introduced to study the cooperative behavior of nations regarding solar geoengineering. The results of this model are explored through numerical methods. A general finding is that cooperation and coordination between nations on solar geoengineering is very much incentivized. Furthermore, the stability of solar geoengineering agreements between nations crucially depends on the perceived riskiness of solar geoengineering. If solar geoengineering is perceived as riskier, the stability of the most stable solar geoengineering agreements is reduced. However, the stability of agreements is completely independent of countries preferences.

Date: 2022-10, Revised 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2210.09145 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2210.09145

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().