Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching

Andrew Tai

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper finds the testable implications of the core in an exchange economy with unit demand when agents' preferences are unobserved. To do so, I develop a model of aggregate matchings in which the core is falsifiable; the identifying assumption is that agents' preferences are solely determined by observable characteristics. I find conditions that characterize when observed economies are compatible with the core. These conditions are meaningful, intuitive, and tractable, providing a nonparametric test for the core in the style of revealed preferences.

Date: 2022-10, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2210.14388

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