Medical Bill Shock and Imperfect Moral Hazard

Alex Hoagland, David M. Anderson and Ed Zhu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consumers are sensitive to medical prices when consuming care, but delays in price information may distort moral hazard. We study how medical bills affect household spillover spending following utilization, leveraging variation in insurer claim processing times. Households increase spending by 22\% after a scheduled service, but then reduce spending by 11\% after the bill arrives. Observed bill effects are consistent with resolving price uncertainty; bill effects are strongest when pricing information is particularly salient. A model of demand for healthcare with delayed pricing information suggests households misperceive pricing signals prior to bills, and that correcting these perceptions reduce average (median) spending by 16\% (7\%) annually.

Date: 2022-11, Revised 2024-03
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.01116 Latest version (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Medical bill shock and imperfect moral hazard (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2211.01116

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