Discovery through Trial Balloons

Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal and an agent face symmetric uncertainty about the value of two correlated projects for the agent. The principal chooses which project values to publicly discover and makes a proposal to the agent, who accepts if and only if the expected sum of values is positive. We characterize optimal discovery for various principal preferences: maximizing the probability of the grand bundle, of having at least one project approved, and of a weighted combination of projects. Our results highlight the usefulness of trial balloons: projects which are ex-ante disfavored but have higher variance than a more favored alternative. Discovering disfavored projects may be optimal even when their variance is lower than that of the alternative, so long as their disfavorability is neither too large nor too small. These conclusions rationalize the inclusion of controversial policies in omnibus bills and the presence of moonshot projects in organizations.

Date: 2022-11, Revised 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
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