The $\kappa$-core and the $\kappa$-balancedness of TU games

David Bartl and Mikl\'os Pint\'er

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem for infinite TU-games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of $\kappa$-additive set functions. Our generalized Bondareva-Shapley Theorem extends previous results by Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967), Schmeidler (1967), Faigle (1989), Kannai (1969), Kannai (1992), Pinter(2011) and Bartl and Pint\'er (2022).

Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
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