The Stackelberg Game: responses to regular strategies

Thomas Byrne

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Following the solution to the One-Round Voronoi Game in arXiv:2011.13275, we naturally may want to consider similar games based upon the competitive locating of points and subsequent dividing of territories. In order to appease the tears of White (the first player) after they have potentially been tricked into going first in a game of point-placement, an alternative game (or rather, an extension of the Voronoi game) is the Stackelberg game where all is not lost if Black (the second player) gains over half of the contested area. It turns out that plenty of results can be transferred from One-Round Voronoi Game and what remains to be explored for the Stackelberg game is how best White can mitigate the damage of Black's placements. Since significant weaknesses in certain arrangements were outlined in arXiv:2011.13275, we shall first consider arrangements that still satisfy these results (namely, White plays a certain grid arrangement) and then explore how Black can best exploit these positions.

Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.06472 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2211.06472

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators (help@arxiv.org).