 Dynamic Equilibrium with Insider Information and General Uninformed Agent UtilityJerome Detemple and Scott Robertson Abstract: We study a continuous time economy where agents have asymmetric information. The informed agent (``$I$''), at time zero, receives a private signal about the risky assets' terminal payoff $\Psi(X_T)$, while the uninformed agent (``$U$'') has no private signal. $\Psi$ is an arbitrary payoff function, and $X$ follows a time-homogeneous diffusion. Crucially, we allow $U$ to have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences with a general utility function on $(0,\infty)$ satisfying the standard conditions. This extends previous constructions of equilibria with asymmetric information used when all agents have exponential utilities and enables us to study the impact of $U$'s initial share endowment on equilibrium. To allow for $U$ to have general preferences, we introduce a new method to prove existence of a partial communication equilibrium (PCE), where at time $0$, $U$ receives a less-informative signal than $I$. In the single asset case, this signal is recoverable by viewing the equilibrium price process over an arbitrarily short period of time, and hence the PCE is a dynamic noisy rational expectations equilibrium. Lastly, when $U$ has power (constant relative risk aversion) utility, we identify the equilibrium price in the small and large risk aversion limits. Date: 2022-11, Revised 2024-03 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2211.15573 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Papers from arXiv.org |
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