Market Design with Distributional Objectives

Isa E. Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, M. Bumin Yenmez and Koji Yokote

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a family of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a level of the distributional objective. We study the desirable properties of choice rules in this family and use them to find all subsets of applications on the Pareto frontier of the distributional objective and merit. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.

Date: 2022-12, Revised 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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