Preferences on Ranked-Choice Ballots

Brian Duricy

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of voters, which indicate that ranked-choice elections require different considerations for voters and candidates alike. While this model assumes that voters vote sincerely, the model of ranked-choice elections this paper presents allows for considerations of strategic voting in future work.

Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-pol
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