Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) Certification and Endogenous Market Structure

Ajay Sharma and Siddhartha Rastogi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper extends the findings of Liu et al. (2015, Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market, Economics Letters), along two dimensions. First, we consider the case of endogenous market structure a la Vives and Singh (1984, Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly, The Rand Journal of Economics). Second, we refine the ECSR certification standards in differentiated duopoly with rankings. We find that optimal ECSR certification standards by NGO are the highest in Bertrand competition, followed by mixed markets and the lowest in Cournot competition. Next, NGO certifier will set the ECSR standards below the optimal level. Also, we show that given the ECSR certification standards, there is a possibility of both price and quantity contracts choices by the firms in endogenous market structure.

Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-env
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Journal Article: Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) Certification and Endogenous Market Structure (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2301.03291

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