The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan M\"uller, Farzad Pourbabaee and Omer Tamuz

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.

Date: 2023-01, Revised 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2301.11237

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