Auctions with Tokens: Monetary Policy as a Mechanism Design Choice

Andrea Canidio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study mechanism design with blockchain-based tokens, that is, tokens that can be used within a mechanism but can also be saved and traded outside of the mechanism. I do so by considering a repeated, private-value auction, in which the auctioneer accepts payments in a blockchain-based token he creates and initially owns. I show that the present-discounted value of the expected revenues is the same as in a standard auction with dollars, but these revenues accrue earlier and are less variable. The optimal monetary policy involves the burning of tokens used in the auction, a common feature of many blockchain-based auctions. I then introduce non-contractible effort and the possibility of misappropriating revenues. I compare the auction with tokens to an auction with dollars in which the auctioneer can also issue financial securities. An auction with tokens is preferred when there are sufficiently severe contracting frictions, while the opposite is true when contracting frictions are low.

Date: 2023-01, Revised 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pay
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