Zero-Leverage Puzzle

Mykola Pinchuk

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, I examine why some firms have zero leverage. I fail to find evidence that firms are unlevered because of managerial entrenchment since these firms do not have weaker corporate governance. I reject the hypothesis that firms become zero-leverage after prolonged periods of high market valuation, since before levering these firms do not suffer from declining valuations and continue to issue large amounts of equity. I find strong evidence in favor of the financial constraints explanation of the zero-leverage puzzle. Zero-leverage firms appear to be financially constrained using three different measures of financial constraints. I obtain mixed evidence on the financial flexibility hypothesis since all-equity firms increase investments and acquisitions after levering, but the probability of their levering decreased during the financial crisis. My results suggest that financial constraints are the first-order the driver of zero-leverage behavior and are more important than less obvious explanations such as managerial entrenchment.

Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-fmk
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2302.00761

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