Solidarity to achieve stability

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo, Elena Inarra and Juan Moreno-Ternero

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Abstract: Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.

Date: 2023-02, Revised 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Solidarity to achieve stability (2024)
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