Multiple-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Values

Hongcheng Li

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies a war of attrition over public good provision among multiple ex-ante asymmetric privately informed players. In equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern in which at most one player provides the public good at time zero with a positive probability, while the other players can become active one after another, each at a player-specific activation time, before which even his highest type does not provide the good. The equilibrium is essentially unique: the types who never provide make the players' costs of providing a saddle point of the equilibrium dynamics. Comparing two players in the same war, I show that the one with lower cost, more impatience, or a value distribution tilted toward high values in the sense of a higher revelation rate provides earlier at every value, other things equal. In large societies, the cost of delay is determined by the highest value across players.

Date: 2023-02, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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