Legitimacy of collective decisions: a mechanism design approach

Kirneva Margarita and N\'u\~nez Mat\'ias

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Abstract: We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming recent impossibility results concerning the implementation of majority rule. The second one adds sequential ratification to the standard majority voting procedure allowing to reach the (correct) outcome in significantly fewer steps than the widely used roll call voting. Both mechanisms use off-equilibrium lotteries to incentivize truthful voting. We discuss different extensions, including the possibility for agents to abstain.

Date: 2023-02, Revised 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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