An Empirical Analysis of Optimal Nonlinear Pricing in Business-to-Business Markets

Soheil Ghili and Russ Yoon

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In continuous-choice settings, consumers decide not only on whether to purchase a product, but also on how much to purchase. Thus, firms optimize a full price schedule rather than a single price point. This paper provides a methodology to empirically estimate the optimal schedule under multi-dimensional consumer heterogeneity with a focus on B2B applications. We apply our method to novel data from an educational-services firm that contains purchase-size information not only for deals that materialized, but also for potential deals that eventually failed. We show that this data, combined with identifying assumptions, helps infer how price sensitivity varies with "customer size". Using our estimated model, we show that the optimal second-degree price discrimination (i.e., optimal nonlinear tariff) improves the firm's profit upon linear pricing by at least 8.2%. That said, this second-degree price discrimination scheme only recovers 7.1% of the gap between the profitability of linear pricing and that of infeasible first degree price discrimination. We also conduct several further simulation analyses (i) empirically quantifying the magnitude by which incentive-compatibility constraints impact the optimal pricing and profits, (ii) comparing the role of demand- v.s. cost-side factors in shaping the optimal price schedule, and (iii) studying the implications of fixed fees for the optimal contract and profitability.

Date: 2023-02, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
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