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Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules

Chris Dong and Patrick Lederer

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Abstract: Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While these rules have recently attracted significant attention, axiomatic characterizations are largely missing so far. We address this problem by characterizing ABC voting rules within the broad and intuitive class of sequential valuation rules. These rules compute the winning committees by sequentially adding candidates that increase the score of the chosen committee the most. In more detail, we first characterize almost the full class of sequential valuation rules based on mild standard conditions and a new axiom called consistent committee monotonicity. This axiom postulates that the winning committees of size k can be derived from those of size k-1 by only adding candidates and that these new candidates are chosen consistently. By requiring additional conditions, we derive from this result also a characterization of the prominent class of sequential Thiele rules. Finally, we refine our results to characterize three well-known ABC voting rules, namely sequential approval voting, sequential proportional approval voting, and sequential Chamberlin-Courant approval voting.

Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-des
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