Ranked Choice Bedlam in a 2022 Oakland School Director Election

David McCune

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The November 2022 ranked choice election for District 4 School Director in Oakland, CA, was very interesting from the perspective of social choice theory. The election did not contain a Condorcet winner and exhibited downward and upward monotonicity paradoxes, for example. Furthermore, an error in the settings of the ranked choice tabulation software led to the wrong candidate being declared the winner. This article explores the strange features of this election and places it in the broader context of ranked choice elections in the United States.

Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.05985 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2303.05985

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().