Redeeming Falsifiability?

Mark Whitmeyer and Kun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. We argue that if the informed expert can acquire additional information, falsifiability does have the power to identify worthless theories.

Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-mic
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