Redeeming Falsifiability?

Mark Whitmeyer and Kun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. In our model, instead of knowing the true data-generating process, the expert knows the state-of-the-art belief over data-generating processes. A non-expert does not. We argue that if the expert can, moreover, acquire additional information to refine this knowledge, falsifiability does have the power to distinguish between experts and non-experts and to identify valuable theories, capitalizing on experts' ability to acquire and refine knowledge.

Date: 2023-03, Revised 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-mic
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