Distributed VC Firms: The Next Iteration of Venture Capital

Mohib Jafri and Andy Wu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Using a combination of incentive modeling and empirical meta-analyses, this paper provides a pointed critique at the incentive systems that drive venture capital firms to optimize their practices towards activities that increase General Partner utility yet are disjoint from improving the underlying asset of startup equity. We propose a "distributed venture firm" powered by software automations and governed by a set of functional teams called "Pods" that carry out specific tasks with immediate and long-term payouts given on a deal-by-deal basis. Avenues are provided for further research to validate this model and discover likely paths to implementation.

Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-ent and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2304.03525

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