Iterated Revelation: How to Incentivize Experts to Reveal Novel Actions
Evan Piermont ()
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
I examine how a decision maker can incentivize an expert to reveal novel actions, expanding the set from which he can choose, without making ex-ante commitments regarding as-of-yet unrevealed actions. The outcomes achievable by any (incentive compatible) mechanism are characterized by the iterated revelation protocol: a simple dynamic interaction where, each round, the expert reveals novel actions and the decision maker adds actions to a shortlist; when nothing novel is revealed, the mechanism ends with the expert choosing an action from the shortlist. Greedy strategies -- where the decision maker optimizes myopically -- delineate the decision maker's maximal payoff achievable by any efficient mechanism.
Date: 2023-04, Revised 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2304.05142
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