Payroll Tax Incidence: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance

Audrey Guo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Economic models assume that payroll tax burdens fall fully on workers, but where does tax incidence fall when taxes are firm-specific and time-varying? Unemployment insurance in the United States has the key feature of varying both across employers and over time, creating the potential for labor demand responses if tax costs cannot be fully passed on to worker wages. Using state policy changes and matched employer-employee job spells from the LEHD, I study how employment and earnings respond to payroll tax increases for highly exposed employers. I find significant drops in employment growth driven by lower hiring, and minimal evidence of pass-through to earnings. The negative employment effects are strongest for young and low-earning workers.

Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-pub
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Journal Article: Payroll tax incidence: Evidence from unemployment insurance (2024)
Working Paper: Payroll Tax Incidence: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2304.05605

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