Unlocking Democratic Efficiency: How Coordinated Outcome-Contingent Promises Shape Decisions

Ali Lazrak and Jianfeng Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We examine pre vote interactions in a committee that enacts a welfare-improving reform through voting in the presence of heterogeneous utilities. Committee members make decentralized, irrevocable promises of non negative transfers contingent on the vote outcome to influence others voting behavior. Equilibrium transfers ensure that no coalition can deviate in a coordinated manner that benefits all members while minimizing total transfers. We show that equilibria exist, are indeterminate, efficient, and involve transfers from high to low utility members. These transfers prevent reform opponents from persuading less enthusiastic supporters to vote against the reform.

Date: 2023-04, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
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