Consistent Linear Orders for Supermajority Rules

Yasunori Okumura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider linear orders of finite alternatives that are constructed by aggregating the preferences of individuals. We focus on a linear order that is consistent with the collective preference relation, which is constructed by one of the supermajority rules and modified using two procedures if there exist some cycles. One modification procedure uses the transitive closure, and the other uses the Suzumura consistent closure. We derive two sets of linear orders that are consistent with the (modified) collective preference relations formed by any of the supermajority rules and show that these sets are generally not empty. These sets of linear orders are closely related to those obtained through the ranked pairs method and the Schulze method. Finally, we consider two social choice correspondences whose output is one of the sets introduced above, and show that the correspondences satisfy the four properties: the extended Condorcet principle, the Pareto principle, the independence of clones, and the reversal symmetry.

Date: 2023-04, Revised 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.09419 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2304.09419

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().