A Partial Order for Strictly Positive Coalitional Games and a Link from Risk Aversion to Cooperation

Jian Yang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more recently proposed by Yang \cite{Y22}, can all be re-cast in this fractional mode. The latter allows a certain ranking between games, which we deem as in the sense of ``centripetality'', to imply a clearly describable shift in the games' stable solutions. %These trends would be preserved after the imposition of the restriction that fractions be positive as well. When coalitions' values are built on both random outcomes and a common positively homogeneous reward function characterizing players' enjoyments from their shares, the above link could help explain why aversion to risk often promotes cooperation.

Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-upt
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