Present-Biased Lobbyists in Linear Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games

Ali Lazrak, Hanxiao Wang and Jiongmin Yong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We investigate a linear quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind turbine farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount performance with a non-constant rate. Our objective is to identify a consistent planning equilibrium in which the players are aware of their inconsistency and cannot commit to a lobbying policy. We analyze the equilibrium behavior in both single player and two-player cases, and compare the behavior of the game under constant and non-constant discount rates. The equilibrium behavior is provided in closed-loop form, either analytically or via numerical approximation. Our numerical analysis of the equilibrium reveals that strategic behavior leads to more intense lobbying without resulting in overshooting.

Date: 2023-04, Revised 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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