Policy Learning under Biased Sample Selection

Lihua Lei, Roshni Sahoo and Stefan Wager

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Practitioners often use data from a randomized controlled trial to learn a treatment assignment policy that can be deployed on a target population. A recurring concern in doing so is that, even if the randomized trial was well-executed (i.e., internal validity holds), the study participants may not represent a random sample of the target population (i.e., external validity fails)--and this may lead to policies that perform suboptimally on the target population. We consider a model where observable attributes can impact sample selection probabilities arbitrarily but the effect of unobservable attributes is bounded by a constant, and we aim to learn policies with the best possible performance guarantees that hold under any sampling bias of this type. In particular, we derive the partial identification result for the worst-case welfare in the presence of sampling bias and show that the optimal max-min, max-min gain, and minimax regret policies depend on both the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) and the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) of potential outcomes given covariates. To avoid finite-sample inefficiencies of plug-in estimates, we further provide an end-to-end procedure for learning the optimal max-min and max-min gain policies that does not require the separate estimation of nuisance parameters.

Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm, nep-exp and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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