Political Strategies to Overcome Climate Policy Obstructionism

Sugandha Srivastav and Ryan Rafaty

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Great socio-economic transitions see the demise of certain industries and the rise of others. The losers of the transition tend to deploy a variety of tactics to obstruct change. We develop a political-economy model of interest group competition and garner evidence of tactics deployed in the global climate movement. From this we deduce a set of strategies for how the climate movement competes against entrenched hydrocarbon interests. Five strategies for overcoming obstructionism emerge: (1) Appeasement, which involves compensating the losers; (2) Co-optation, which seeks to instigate change by working with incumbents; (3) Institutionalism, which involves changes to public institutions to support decarbonization; (4) Antagonism, which creates reputational or litigation costs to inaction; and (5) Countervailance, which makes low-carbon alternatives more competitive. We argue that each strategy addresses the problem of obstructionism through a different lens, reflecting a diversity of actors and theories of change within the climate movement. The choice of which strategy to pursue depends on the institutional context.

Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ene and nep-env
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Published in Perspectives on Politics, First View: pp.1-11 (2022)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2304.14960

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