Beneficence Signaling in AI Development Dynamics

Sarita Rosenstock

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper motivates and develops a framework for understanding how the socio-technical systems surrounding AI development interact with social welfare. It introduces the concept of ``signaling'' from evolutionary game theory and demonstrates how it can enhance existing theory and practice surrounding the evaluation and governance of AI systems.

Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-evo and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2305.02561

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