Disclosure and Incentives in Teams
Paula Onuchic and
Papers from arXiv.org
We consider a team-production environment where all participants are motivated by career concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational implications for different team members. In this context, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team-outcomes when team-disclosure choices aggregate individual decisions through some deliberation protocol. In contrast with individual disclosure problems, we show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure. Furthermore, we study the effort-incentive properties of equilibrium disclosure strategies implied by different deliberation protocols; and show that the partial disclosure of team outcomes may improve individuals' incentives to contribute to the team. Finally, we study the design of deliberation protocols, and characterize productive environments where effort-incentives are maximized by unilateral decision protocols or more consensual deliberation procedures.
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