Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Data
Jose Higueras
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
I study how to regulate firms' access to consumer data when a regulator faces non-Bayesian uncertainty about how firms will exploit the consumer's information to segment the market and set prices. I fully characterize all worst-case optimal policies when the regulator maximizes consumer surplus: the regulator allows a firm to access data only if the firm cannot use the database to identify a small group of consumers.
Date: 2023-05, Revised 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-mfd, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2305.05822
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