COWPEA (Candidates Optimally Weighted in Proportional Election using Approval voting)

Toby Pereira

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper describes COWPEA (Candidates Optimally Weighted in Proportional Election using Approval voting), a method of proportional representation that uses approval voting. It has also been used in other contexts and been referred to as Random Priority, though it is underdeveloped in the literature. COWPEA optimally elects an unlimited number of candidates with potentially different weights to a body, rather than giving a fixed number equal weight. A non-deterministic Approval-Based Committee (ABC) version that elects a fixed a number of candidates with equal weight is known as COWPEA Lottery. This is the only proportional ABC method known to pass the criteria of monotonicity, strong candidate Pareto efficiency, multi-winner participation, Independence of Irrelevant Ballots (IIB), Independence of Universally Approved Candidates (IUAC), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and independence of clones. It is also possible to convert COWPEA and COWPEA Lottery to use score ballots. They are compared against Optimal PAV and Optimal PAV Lottery, which have good overall criterion compliance but fail monotonicity. This paper introduces Perfect Representation In the Limit (PRIL) as a new proportionality criterion.

Date: 2023-04, Revised 2026-10
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