Coordinating Charitable Donations

Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Charity is typically carried out by individual donors, who donate money to charities they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities. Individual charity respects the will of the donors, but may be inefficient due to a lack of coordination; centralized charity is potentially more efficient, but may ignore the will of individual donors. We present a mechanism that combines the advantages of both methods for donors with Leontief preferences (i.e., each donor seeks to maximize an individually weighted minimum of all contributions across the charities). The mechanism distributes the contribution of each donor efficiently such that no subset of donors has an incentive to redistribute their donations. Moreover, it is group-strategyproof, satisfies desirable monotonicity properties, maximizes Nash welfare, returns a unique Lindahl equilibrium, can be computed efficiently, and implemented via natural best-response spending dynamics.

Date: 2023-05, Revised 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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