Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees
Jason Milionis,
Ciamac C. Moallemi and
Tim Roughgarden
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated market maker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidity providers (LPs) due to arbitrage. We extend the model of Milionis et al. [2022] for a general class of two asset AMMs to introduce both fees and discrete Poisson block generation times. In our setting, we are able to compute the expected instantaneous rate of arbitrage profit in closed form. When the fees are low, in the fast block asymptotic regime, the impact of fees takes a particularly simple form: fees simply scale down arbitrage profits by the fraction of blocks which present profitable trading opportunities to arbitrageurs. This fraction decreases with an increasing block rate, hence our model yields an important practical insight: faster blockchains will result in reduced LP losses. Further introducing gas fees (fixed costs) in our model, we show that, in the fast block asymptotic regime, lower gas fees lead to smaller losses for LPs.
Date: 2023-05, Revised 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mfd and nep-mst
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2305.14604
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