Cautious Belief and Iterated Admissibility

Emiliano Catonini and Nicodemo De Vito

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and common cautious belief in cautious rationality" in a terminal lexicographic type structure. For arbitrary type structures, the behavioral implications of these epistemic assumptions are characterized by the solution concept of self-admissible set (Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler 2008). We also show that analogous conclusions hold under alternative epistemic assumptions, in particular if cautiousness is "transparent" to the players. KEYWORDS: Epistemic game theory, iterated admissibility, weak dominance, lexicographic probability systems. JEL: C72.

Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mfd and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Cautious belief and iterated admissibility (2024)
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