Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs

Simon Finster

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that defines cost interdependence to express these preferences. This facilitates the use of linear programming to characterize Walrasian equilibrium prices. Firstly, we show that equilibrium prices are uniform, anonymous, and linear in packages. Prices and marginal gains exhibit a nested structure, which we characterize in closed form for complete graphs. Secondly, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of package-linear competitive prices using an ascending auction implementation. Our framework of partition preferences ensures fair and transparent dual pricing and admits preferences over the concentration of allocated bundles in the market.

Date: 2023-06, Revised 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
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