Sketching a Model on Fisheries Enforcement and Compliance -- A Survey

Manuel Coelho, Jos\'e Ant\'onio Filipe and Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira

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Abstract: Monitoring and enforcement considerations have been largely forgotten in the study of fishery management. This paper discusses this issue through a model formalization to show the impacts of costly, imperfect enforcement of law on the behavior of fishing firms and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis merges a standard bio-economic model of fisheries (Gordon-Schaefer) with Becker theory of Crime and Punishment.

Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-law
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