Unraveling Coordination Problems

Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme that induces coordination on a given outcome of the game as its unique equilibrium. Optimal subsidies are unique, symmetric for identical players, continuous functions of model parameters, and do not make the targeted strategies strictly dominant for any one player; these properties differ starkly from canonical results in the literature. Uncertainty about payoffs impels policy moderation as overly aggressive intervention might itself induce coordination failure. JEL codes: D81, D82, D83, D86, H20. Keywords: mechanism design, global games, contracting with externalities, unique implementation.

Date: 2023-07, Revised 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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