Economics at your fingertips  

Repeated Bidding with Dynamic Value

Benjamin Heymann, Alexandre Gilotte and R\'emi Chan-Renous

Papers from

Abstract: We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding policy, and then, because optimal might be impractical, we discuss the cost for the buyer of limiting himself to shading policies.

Date: 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

Page updated 2023-09-23
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2308.01755