The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint

Felix Brandt and Florian Grundbacher

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Abstract: Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that refinements of the Banks set, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can also be disjoint from the bipartisan set.

Date: 2023-08, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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